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I. INTRODUCTION
The problems caused by divorce and the resultant break-up of the
family have been well documented.1 It has also been well documented
* Associate Professor, North Carolina Central University School of Law, Durham, North Carolina.
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that divorce in America routinely exceeds 50% of marriages.2 This has
created a cultural shift where marriage appears to be no longer a lifetime
commitment. Worse, in some sectors of society, marriage appears to
have past its time. 3  Some blame the liberalization of the divorce laws,
particularly the emergence of the "no fault" divorce laws for the divorce
explosion, and the evidence appears to support this claim.4 It is not clear
how much of the divorce explosion can be blamed on the no-fault or
"irreconcilable differences" grounds for divorce, but removing the
stigma of divorce probably played a role in the increase of divorce. The
2009). Prof. Mombrun has also published a number of articles appearing in the Fordham Journal of
Corporate & Financial Law, Ohio Northern Law Review, The Tax Lawyer, The Journal of Law and
Education, The Journal of Corporate Taxation, Tax Notes, and other journals. Prior to teaching
Prof. Mombrun was an Assistant Branch Chief in the National Office of the IRS in Washington,
D.C., specializing in corporate taxation. The author wishes to thank Dean Raymond C. Pierce and
Associate Dean Wendy Brown Scott of the NCCU School of Law for providing financial support in
the form of a summer research grant despite the current financially challenging environment. The
author also wishes to thank Kia Love and Maria DeRamos for research assistance.
1. See Paul R. Amato, The Consequences of Divorce for Adults and Children, 62 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1269 (2004). The impact of divorce on the child can be devastating. Studies
have shown that children of intact families enjoy better physical health than children in disrupted
families, including a lesser chance of contracting asthma. Adjusted for race and economic status,
children who live in a single parent household are 50% more likely to have fair or poor health than
children in two-parent families. Even more alarming, parental divorce before the age of twenty-one
was a key predictor of an early death. John F. Coverdale, Missing Persons: Children in the Tax
Treatment of Marriage, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 475, 485-86 (1998). This is a serious problem
that needs to be addressed for the sake of our future. One might even argue that the economic
wealth of our country depends on it, especially in light of greater competition from countries like
China. It is not inevitable that we will continue to prosper and if we do not ensure the prosperity of
our greatest asset, our children, the future will indeed be bleak. See Peter G. Peterson, How will
America Pay for the Retirement of the Baby Boomers?, in THE GENERATIONAL EQUITY DEBATE 42
(Williamson et. al. eds., 1999). For an article discussing ways the U.S. can lessen the impact of its
impending decline in science and engineering, See Richard B. Freeman, Does Globalization of the
Scientific/Engineering Workforce Threaten U.S. Economic Leadership? 6 Innovation Policy and
the Economy 123 (2006), available at
http://www.nber.org/chapters/cO2O7.pdfhttp://www.nber.org/chapters/cO207.pdfhttp://www.nber.or
g/chapters/c0207.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). Among other things, the author argues that
United States dominance in science and engineering is being challenged because while other
countries such as Japan, China, and the European Union have increased their share of graduates in
science and engineering, U.S. degrees in these fields have stagnated. Id. at 125.
2. See LINDA J. WAITE & MELISSA J.K. HOWE, The Family, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICA:
THE ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL NATION 313 (Peter Schuck & John Q. Wilson eds., 2008)
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING AMERICA].
3. Id. at 315. (The authors depict the decline in marriage from 72% of the adult population
in 1970 to 54% in 2000. The authors also note that the decline in marriage has been largest among
women with little education while the rate of marriage has remained constant among women who
are college educated).
4. Id. at 313.
5. See id
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economic freedom enjoyed by women since the 1950s as they entered
the job market probably played the major role.6
One of the by-products of divorce has been the significant increase
in single-parent households.7  Notwithstanding the separation of the
child's parents, the responsibility of raising the child remains that of
both parents. At the risk of paraphrasing Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas, this appears to be a natural law and it certainly is
ingrained in our enacted laws.9 Usually when a relationship (marital or
otherwise) ends and there are children born of that relationship, at least
one of the parents is granted custody of the offspring of the relationship.
The custodial parent is expected to provide sustenance to his or her
offspring in the form of shelter, food, clothing, and other basic needs.
The non-custodial parent is also required to provide for the child's
sustenance in the form of child support payments.' 0
Child support orders are the most common forms of civil court
orders. 1' And violations of those orders are the most frequent of court
order violations. It has been said that failure to pay child support is the
most frequently committed crime in America. This crime is most
6. Jacob Minter, Intercountry Comparisons of Labor Force Trends and of Related
Developments: An Overview, 3 J. LABOR ECON. SI, S5 (1985).
7. See UNDERSTANDING AMERICA, supra note 2, at 316.
8. Notwithstanding his disclaimers during his confirmation hearings, Justice Clarence
Thomas apparently believes in a strong role of natural law, that is, a set of immutable laws and
rights that precede the creation of the State, in interpreting the constitution. Kirk A. Kennedy,
Reaffirming the Natural Law Jurisprudence of Justice Clarence Thomas, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 33,
41 (1997). Examples of natural laws include: "(1) To do what is good and avoid what is bad, (2)
To preserve life, man's own being, and his existence, (3) To preserve the species through sexual
reproduction, (4) To live in community with other men, and (5) To avoid ignorance and develop the
intellect whose object is the search for truth." Id. at 42 (quoting ETIENNE GILSON, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 328-29 (1993)).
9. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. § 12-204 (West 2007) (imposing child support
obligations on parents in almost under any circumstance, even in case of voluntary
impoverishment).
10. Id.
11. See Ira Mark Ellman & Tara O'Toole Ellman, The Theory of Child Support, 45 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 107, 108 (2008).
12. CAROLE A. CHAMBERS, CHILD SUPPORT: How TO GET WHAT YOUR CHILD NEEDS AND
DESERVES, 17 (1991) (quoting Justice Richard J. Huttner, New York State Supreme Court). As the
title of the book suggests, this is a self-help book for the custodial parent looking to get child
support from the non-custodial parent. While the book has some very good suggestions for the
custodial parent such as reminders that she is to put her feelings aside and focus on her children's
needs, some of the recommendations, such as when determining how much support your child
needs "this is not the time to underestimate expenses," can be misinterpreted. Id. at 20-21. See also
Martha Minow, How Should We Think About Child Support Obligations?, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE:
THE REVOLUTION IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 302, 305 (Garfinkel et al. eds., 1998). Minow
summarizes the duty of parents by quoting William Blackstone:
201l] 109
3
Mombrun: Shifting the Paradigm by Bringing Tax Arbitrage to the Lower Inco
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
often committed by men because women continue to be awarded
custody of children following the break-up of the family.' 3  Hence, the
moniker "Deadbeat Dad" is often used to describe the parent failing to
pay child support.14  There are many reasons why the non-custodial
parents do not make their child support payments, such as: bitterness,
lack of visitation with his children, remarriage, and lack of employment
or underemployment.' 5  The federal government has been getting tough
with parents who fail to meet their child support responsibilities over the
past few decades by garnishing their wages, revoking their driver's
licenses, offering them the choice of paying what they owe or having a
sterilization procedure,16 and even jailing them.17 All of these sanctions
have failed to deter this crime. In 2006, it was estimated that the amount
of child support in arrears was between $89 billion and $105 billion. 19
Clearly, society is failing in its attempts to get parents to take financial
responsibility for their children and the parents are arguably laughing all
the way to the bank.
In a previous article, I called for allowing a deduction for child
support payments as a way to entice payment of child support debt.20
Mindful of the exploding government deficit, I also called for the
custodial parent to include child support payments in income, the idea
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle of
natural law; an obligation ... laid on them not only by nature herself but by their own
proper act, in bringing them into the world; for they would be in the highest manner
injurious to their issue; if they only gave their children life that they might afterwards see
them perish.
Id.
13. See infra note 53.
14. This is the accepted normal construct used by the popular media to describe the father
who misses child support payments regardless of the reason. See DEENA MANDELL, DEADBEAT
DADs-SuBJEcTIvrry AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, 178 (2002).
15. See Reginald Mombrun, An End to the Deadbeat Dad Dilemma? Puncturing the
Paradigm By Allowing a Deduction for Child Support Payments, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
211, 228-31 (2008).
16. See Andrea W. Fancher, Thinking Outside The Box-A Constitutional Analysis of the
Option to Choose Between Jail and Procreation, 19 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 328 (2006) (discussing
the constitutionality of offering defendants who are significantly behind in their child support
payments the option of going to jail or having a vasectomy). The article concludes that under a
strict constitutional analysis standard, the vasectomy option would not pass constitutional muster
and that a lesser standard (the reasonable standard) should be applied and under this standard, the
option would pass constitutional muster. See id. at 346.
17. See also Jennifer Goulah, The Cart Before the Horse: Michigan Jumps the Gun in Jailing
Deadbeat Dads, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 479,486-87 (2006).
18. Id.at479.
19. See infra note 114.
20. Mombnm, supra note 15, at 252-53.
110 [26:107
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being that receiving payment is better than receiving no payment even
though such payment may be saddled with a tax.21 This call has been
echoed by other commentators, 22 but Congress has not taken measures
to adopt any legislation that would accomplish this.
The background for this article is, of course, the duty of parents to
provide sustenance for their children, a duty that necessarily survives the
break-up of the family. In this article, I continue to address the problems
of the child support system, and I continue to take a holistic view of the
problem. A fundamental concept of family law is that the system must
do what is in the best interests of the child.23 Few people will disagree
with the soundness of this fundamental concept. However, the problem
lies with its application. Although counterintuitive, focusing solely on
the child to the exclusion of his parents may not always be in the best
interests of the child because the child needs strong parents.24 Hence,
21. Id. at 253.
22. See, e.g., Irwin Garfinkel, et al., Child Support and Child Well-being: W7hat Have We
Learned?, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 1, 23-24 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1994)
(calling for an assured child support benefit, a new form of social security benefit to serve as a
backup for private support); Laura Bigler, A Change is Needed: The Taxation ofAlimony and Child
Support, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 361 (2000) (calling for a deduction for child support payments); ABA
Delegates Adopt Resolution to Equalize Child Support, Alimony Treatment, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA)
No. 154 (Aug. 11, 1989) (calling for legislation to include all family support payments (including
child support) in income of payee and provide a deduction to payor); Wendy Gerzog Shaller, On
Policy Grounds, A Limited Tax Credit For Child Support and Alimony, 11 AM. J. TAX. POL'Y 321
(1994) (calling for a limited tax credit for alimony and child support payments); Deborah H.
Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121,
162 (1989) (arguing that all payments to ex-spouses should be treated as alimony payments unless
the parties otherwise agree to a contrary treatment).
23. For an exhaustive analysis of this concept including links to state statutes addressing the
concept, see Determining the Best Interests of the Child: Summary of State Laws, CHILD WELFARE
INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, available at
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwidellawspolicies/statutes/bestinterest.cfn (last visited Sept.
1, 2010). The agency notes that although there is no standard definition of "best interests of the
child," state statutes provide guiding principles to making this determination. Among the guidelines
that the states provide include: "the importance of family integrity and preference for avoiding
removal of the child from his/her home," "the health, safety and/or protection of the child," "the
importance of timely permanency decision," "the assurance that a child removed from his/her home
will be given care, treatment and guidance that will assist the child . . . ." Id. at 2. Some states also
provide specific factors for their courts to look at in making a best interests decision. These factors
include: "the emotional ties and relationship between the child and his or her parents, siblings and
other family members or caregivers," "the capacity of the parents to provide a safe home and
adequate food, clothing and medical care, the mental and physical health needs of the child," "the
mental and physical needs of the parents," and "the presence of domestic violence in the home." Id.
at 3. Other factors that the courts should consider include federal and/or state constitutional
protections, the importance of maintaining sibling and other close family bonds and the child's
wishes. Id. at 4-5.
24. It is very telling that airlines routinely tell their passengers traveling with young children
that, in case of emergency, they should put on their oxygen masks first before attending to their
201l] Ill
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being mindful of the welfare of the child's parents is central to the well-
being of the child. This means that if the concerns of the non-custodial
parents who are behind in their child support payments are addressed
and if they are financially able to make their child support payments,
they will, and their children will benefit. The evidence clearly shows
that these parents are usually poor males.25 Middle and upper class
parents usually meet their child support obligations notwithstanding the
bitterness and rancor that his or her divorce or separation may have
caused.26
There are clear societal benefits to stable families,27 and society as
a whole is negatively impacted when families break up. Although the
definition of the family unit has morphed over time, 9 when a family
breaks up, all of the family members go through a difficult time, and this
especially true of the children. Lessening family break-ups should be a
societal goal, but if the break-up cannot be avoided, then an important
secondary goal should be lessening the negative impact on the children.
Some families are able to achieve this secondary goal,30 but the majority
children. Most parents would naturally want to attend to their children but in this case, putting the
parent's need for oxygen first is in the best interests of the child because an unconscious parent will
be of no help to the child and will only worsen the emergency.
25. Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt And The Indigent Child Support Obligor: The
Silent Return OfDebtor's Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95, 131 (2008).
26. See supra, note 12, FATHERS UNDER FIRE: THE REVOLUTION IN CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, at 23.
27. Such benefits include better long-term health of children, greater psychological stability,
and better success in school. Amato, supra note 1, at 1278.
28. See id.
29. The major difference in today's family is that the mother is more likely to work. Hence,
current laws, which reflect past notions of the mother as the caretaker (thereby granted sole custody
of the separated child) and the father as the provider are no longer appropriate. See C. Garrison
Lepow, The Flimjlam Father: Deconstructing Parent-Child Stereotypes In Federal Tax Subsidies,
5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIs. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 134 (2001). See also Wendy C. Gerzog, Families For Tax
Purposes: What About The Steps?, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 811-14 (2009) (calling for
treating step family members as family members for all purposes. This would end the tax advantage
they enjoy as they are treated as family members for many income tax benefit sections but are
excluded from the definition of family member for business entity attribution purposes and for gift
and estate tax anti-abuse provisions).
30. See CONSTANCE AHRONS, THE GOOD DIVORCE (1994), a book claiming that a good
divorce is not an oxymoron and advocating traits for achieving such a result. In the book, the author
discusses different types of divorced relationships. The author first groups divorced couples into
amicable groups and arch-enemies. Id. at 5-6. The amicable group consists of two smaller groups,
cooperative colleagues and perfect pals. Id. at 6. Cooperative colleagues are couples who deal with
their anger in productive ways and manage not to let their children get caught in the middle. Id.
Perfect pals were a small group and consist of couples who remain best friends after divorce and
continue to enjoy an intimate relationship. Id. The author divides the arch-enemies into two
groups, angry associates and fiery foes. The angry associates are "not able to confine their anger
112 [26:107
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fail miserably and become embroiled in petty battles and keeping
score,3 1 to the detriment of the children. One way to put the odds in
favor of children is to ensure that both parents, especially fathers, remain
actively involved in the life of children.32 There are great societal
benefits to be gained when the father is involved in the life of his
children, including psychological well-being and stability in school. 33
How can society reduce the number of parents failing to live up to their
parental obligations? I propose that this can be accomplished by
ensuring that parents are able to make their child support payments. In
the current political and fiscal landscape calling for a plan reminiscent of
the Marshall plan34 for non-custodial parents would be a non-starter.
The custodial parent frequently understands the plight of the parent
struggling to meet his or her obligations35 and custodial parents have
often been willing to help by allowing the non-custodial parent to claim
the child dependency exemption. This is self-help and tax arbitrage3 6
that is blessed by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").37
. . . and it infuse[s] all the relationships in the family." Id. The fiery foes have an even worse
relationship, continue to have battles for custody and sometimes even resort to violence. Id. at 7.
Finally, the author discusses the dissolved duos, ex-spouses "who totally discontinue contact with
each other and one parent disappears completely from their children's lives." Id.
3 1. Id
32. See Paul R. Amato, Father-Child Relations, Mother-Child Relations, and Offspring
Psychological Well-Being in Early Adulthood, 56 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1031, 1031 (1994).
33. Id In his study, the author found that "closeness to fathers makes a unique contribution to
offspring happiness, life satisfaction and psychological distress". Id. The study concludes that
"fathers are important figures in the lives of young adults." Id
34. The Marshall Plan refers to the economic, social and political remaking of Western
Europe undertaken by the United States after World War II. The heart of the plan was a massive
economic transfer to Europe. The plan was named after Secretary of State George Marshall and is
credited for saving Western Europe but it has its detractors. For an exhaustive description of the
plan, see MICHAEL J. HOGAN, THE MARSHALL PLAN: AMERICA, BRITAIN AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1947-1952 (1987).
35. A 1992 survey of the General Accountability Office (GAO) shows that 66% of custodial
mothers stated the reason they are not getting support from their father's child is that "he can't pay."
See Ronald K. Henry, Child Support Policy and the Unintended Consequences of Good Intentions,
in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 128, 155 (William S. Comanor ed.,
2004).
36. Tax arbitrage is defined as "[t]he practice of profiting from differences between the way
transactions are treated for tax purposes." http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tax-arbitrage.asp.
(last visited May 3, 2011).
37. See IRS Form 8332, Release/Revocation of Release of Claim to Exemption for Child by
Custodial Parent. Some States also have forms parallel to Form 8332. For example California's
form specifically provides that the dependency exemption is granted to the non-custodial parent on
the express assumption that he is current in his child support payments. See 6-214 CALIFORNIA
FAMILY LAW PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 214.46 (2d ed. 2009).
2011] 113
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In this article, I will address the notion of tax arbitrage following
divorce or separation. Simply put, tax arbitrage is the notion of "You
scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." Following divorce or
separation, this phenomenon mostly occurs in middle to upper income
families38 that understand (through proper tax advice) that sometimes
allowing the non-custodial parent to claim the child dependency
exemption ultimately lowers overall taxes for the family unit and
bolsters economic wealth. This tax savings can then be passed on to the
custodial parent in the form of higher child support payments and/or
more regular child support payments. Tax arbitrage is less pervasive in
lower income families causing them to forgo over $6 billion per year in
potential tax savings.39  In this article, I will suggest several ways to
address the problem including proposed legislative language.
In Part II, I will outline the problems of divorce and the break-up of
the family. I will also discuss the historical and continuing child support
dilemma that we face and the notion of public versus private
responsibilities for raising children. Finally, I will chronicle the rise of
parents failing to meet their child support obligations. In Part III, I will
address the government's response to the increasing number of these
parents including imposing tougher penalties on these parents who fail to
meet their obligations and the constitutional challenges of arresting them
for a monetary debt. I will contrast this with commentators calling for
more investment in human capital. I will also discuss whether the rise of
Obamanomics 40 and the decline of Reaganomics41 will affect our overall
approach to the problem. In Part IV, I will discuss tax arbitrage in
general and in the separated family context and will outline why this
form of self-help is not prevalent in the lower income community even
though it has been sanctioned by the IRS. I will argue that taking
38. See infra note 229.
39. See Adam Looney, Trading Tax Benefits for Child Support? The Incidence of Child-
Related Tax Benefits Among Separated Parents (c. 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author).
40. Obamanomics refers to economic policies associated with the Obama administration.
They generally include a bottom up approach that believes economic growth depends largely on the
productivity of workers. The focus of such policies tends to be on the internal needs of the United
States. See Robert B. Reich, A Short Primer on McCainomics versus Obamanomics, ROBERT
REICH (July 22, 2008), http://robertreich.org/post/257309630 [hereinafter Reich, A Short Primer];
Robert B. Reich, Obamanomics Isn't About Big Government, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2009, at Al;
David Ignatius, Rolling Out Obamanomics, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2009, at A21.
41. Reaganomics refers to economic policies associated with former President Ronald
Reagan. Unlike Obama, Reagan preferred a trickle down version of economics where capital was
favored over labor. As capital grows, wealth would presumably trickle down to those who do not
hold capital assets. The central tenet of Reaganomics is lower taxes.
114 [26:107
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advantage of tax benefits allowed by Congress should not depend on
one's tax sophistication, and I will also discuss State court cases that
mandate tax arbitrage in the separated family context. I will provide
general background on tax arbitrage and the contexts where it is seen-
colleges, hospitals and other businesses. As discussed in Part IV, direct
tax arbitrage is prohibited by the tax code but indirect tax arbitrage is
hard, if not impossible, to stamp out; after all, money is fungible.
Hence, notwithstanding efforts to stamp out tax arbitrage, it is still
prevalent. When taxpayers engage in tax arbitrage in the separated
family setting, this may give rise to 16% in increased child support
42payments and, more importantly, increased visitation by the non-
custodial parent because there appears to be a direct correlation between
making child support payments and increased visitation.43 I will include
an example of the benefit of tax arbitrage in a moderate income
situation. This example will highlight the increased tax benefits that the
separated couple would receive if they engage in tax arbitrage.
Finally in Part V, I will discuss solutions to the problem including
suggested statutory language. The solutions that I prefer take a bottom
up approach and level the playing field for the lower income family by
putting the burden on the IRS to determine whether the non-custodial
parent would benefit more from the child dependency exemption and,
thus, should be allocated the deduction, ultimately ensuring a more
secure source of child support payments. This is the exact approach
taken by some judges because they understand that the child dependency
exemption is an economic benefit that should ultimately be part of the
child support equation." The IRS has achieved some success in
administering the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 45 now the largest
government cash transfer program,46 and notwithstanding the IRS's
42. See Looney, supra note 39, at 2.
43. See infra note 217.
44. See, e.g., Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548, 551 (S.D. 1989).
45. For an exhaustive description of the EITC, see Wanda Theriot, The Earned Income Tax
Credit: Putting it to Work for the Working Poor, 2 Loy. POVERTY L.J. 125 (1996). The EITC was
enacted in 1975 by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975. Id. at 126. The original focus of the EITC was
to help working families with children, but it was expanded in 1993 to cover workers who did not
have children since the goal of the EITC was to provide an incentive for work. Id. at 126-28. The
EITC has enjoyed broad bipartisan support and is now widely used by low income taxpayers. Id. at
130-31. In 1989, only 40,000 families used the EITC; by 1996, this had jumped to 21 million
families. Id. at 128-29. The EITC has also outpaced traditional welfare programs in size and is
administered by the IRS and not by government welfare agents. Id. at 131.
46. Twenty-two million families receive a total of $34 billion from the EITC program. It has,
thus, eclipsed the Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), the successor to the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, as the largest federal government cash transfer program. See Nadia Eissa
2011] 115
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apparently lackluster computer systems, 47 it should be able to easily
handle such operations. 48
II. THE CHALLENGES OF THE CHILD SUPPORT SYSTEM.
A. History of Child Support in the United States
Today, child support payments are made mostly by fathers because,
upon separation of the family, mothers usually receive custody of
children.4 9  However, this is changing as more judges are becoming
more comfortable granting joint and sole custody to fathers. It may
seem natural to grant custody of children to the mother because she is
seen as the more nurturing parent and thus, most able to raise children, 52
but this has not always been the case. In early America, the children
stayed with their father if parents divorced.53  This was the prevalent
culture54 at the time. Prior to the industrial revolution, the economy of
& Hilary W. Hoynes, Behavioral Responses to Taxes: Lessons from the EITC and Labor Supply, 79
TAX POL'Y & ECON. 73, 73 (2006).
47. See Anne Broache, IRS Trudges on with Aging Computers, CNET News (Apr. 12, 2007),
available at http://news.cnet.com/2100-1028_3-6175657.html. For a more optimistic outlook, see
Charles 0. Rossoti, Modernizing the IRS, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 615, 620-21 (2001).
48. The IRS has handled such operations in the past for taxpayers who request that the IRS
compute their taxes or credits. For example, taxpayers have the choice of either determining their
own EITC credit or they can have the IRS compute it for them. See 1040 Form and Instructions
2010, P. 47. Anecdotally, I forgot to compute my Making Work Pay Credit for 2009 (Form 1040,
line 63); the IRS computed the credit sua sponte and sent me a refund of my overpayment.
49. See Frank J. Furstenberg, Jr., Dealing with Dads: The Changing Roles of Fathers, in
ESCAPE FROM POVERTY: WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE FOR CHILDREN 189, 196 (P. Lindsay Chase-
Lansdale & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1995).
50. See MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL & JOEL FRIEDMAN, DEADBEAT DADS-A NATIONAL
CHILD SUPPORT SCANDAL, 88-89 (1996) (reporting that courts are moving more toward
recommending that parents share custody because this is generally better for the child).
51. See Henry, supra note 35, at 138 (describing a 2004 survey that found that 18% of single
parents are men, an increase of 25% over the previous three years).
52. BOUMIL & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, at 87. The mother has been traditionally assigned
the role of the caretaker because she normally did not work outside the home. This has greatly
changed as more women have entered the labor force.
53. See Henry, supra note 35, at 138 (discussing an "early feminist meeting ... in 1848 ...
[that] included the fact that fathers automatically received custody of children as a principal
complaint," mostly because they needed the help of the children on the farm); see also SIMONE
SPENCE, DEADBEATS: WHAT RESPONSIBLE PARENTS NEED TO KNow 15 (2000), at xiv (claiming
that up until the nineteenth century, fathers were usually awarded custody of children because since
women did not work outside the marriage, they could not afford to take care of children). The two
authors have slightly different reasons why men were allowed custody but both reasons are
grounded on economics.
54. See THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (rev. ed. 1980) (defining culture as the
sum total of ways of living built up by a group of human beings and transmitted from one
generation to another).
116 AKRON TAX JOURNAL [26:107
10
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 26 [2011], Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol26/iss1/4
SHIFTING THE PARADIGM
the United States was primarily agrarian. As titular head of the family,
the father needed as much help as he could get on the farm. As a result,
American society in the eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries
emphasized "the father's centrality in raising the children and preparing
them for the adult world."5 5  As the industrial revolution progressed,
fathers tended to work outside the homestead.56 Thus, the image of the
father settled into that of the "external wage-earner," with the mother as
"home-bound nurturer,"57 giving rise to the "cult of motherhood" and
the "tender years doctrine" of the early twentieth century.5 8
During these times, child support payment orders were rare owing
to the fact that parents were only charged with providing a home for
their children.5 9 Further, the divorce rate was extremely low due to both
the economically devastating costs of divorce and enormous social
pressure against the dissolution of marriage.60 There were also legal
impediments to forcing one parent to pay child support to the other.6'
In the early twentieth century, there was a "reorientation of welfare
policy toward children."62 The shift was "premised on the belief that the
mother-child relationship was fundamental and sacred and that home life
should be encouraged and strengthened." 63 There is also evidence that a
precursor to our current welfare system was the attempt in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries "to assist poor children in their
55. Henry, supra note 35, at 138.
56. See P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale & Maris A. Vinovskis, Whose Responsibility? An
Historical Analysis of the Changing Roles of Mothers, Fathers & Society, in ESCAPE FROM
POVERTY: WHAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE FOR CHILDREN 11, 15 (P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale &
Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1995). Although "the father remained the head of the household and was
responsible for the education and well-being of the children," his role "diminished as his place of
work became separated from home." Id,
57. Henry, supra note 35, at 138. Other reasons have been cited for this change. In the
Puritan homes of mid-seventeenth century New England, the father was the early educator of the
children owing to church pressure and his own educational superiority in the household. This role
of educator was transferred to the mother due to the sudden and unexpected drop in church
attendance by Puritan men. See Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis, supra note 56, at 13.
58. Henry, supra note 35, at 138.
59. See id. at 138-39.
60. See JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, THE POLITICS OF CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 57-59
(2003).
61. English law provided that the responsibility of raising children rested with both parents'
duties. Hence, one parent could not collect money from another parent for discharging his or her
duties. American law distanced itself from that view by first recognizing the right of a third-party
benefactor to sue a parent for necessities provided to his child. Once that right was recognized, it
was extended to a former spouse. See Mombrun, supra note 15, at 225-26.
62. Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis, supra note 56, at 19.
63. Id.
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own homes." 64  There were also early efforts in some States to
criminalize non-payment of child support. In most states, however,
these new criminal laws were only enforced in cases where destitute
children were victimized.66 More comprehensive enforcement of the
child support laws was still a few decades away.
B. Federal Government Involvement
The federal government's involvement in supporting children has
been recorded as far back as the end of the Civil War and the
establishment of the Freedman's Bureau to support the newly freed
Blacks. The federal government also provided "pensions for disabled
Union soldiers or their widows and dependent children."6 7
The federal government did not begin to play a more central role in
welfare and child support until after the Depression with the passage of
the Social Security Act and Aid to Dependent Children Act. By the
1960s, the federal government assumed the central role. The father, in
theory, remained the party responsible for the well-being of his children
but few enforcement efforts were made against him. The last twenty
years witnessed an explosion in child support enforcement spurred on, in
part, by the bi-partisan Family Support Act of 1988.69 The Family
Support Act reflected changes in society's views about child support and
greater emphasis on the responsibility of fathers. Such greater share of
responsibility was advocated as far back as 1949 when former President
Gerald Ford introduced a bill (H.R. 4580) on that score as a
Congressman. 70
The stronger penalties urged by the Family Support Act did not
produce the desired results.7 1 This failure stems from the fact that the
64. Id. at 31.
65. Id. at 20.
66. Id.
67. Id at 18.
68. See id. at 21-22. The Aid to Dependent Children program was intended to cover all needy
children in single-mother households, states restricted assistance by insisting that children had to
live in a "suitable" home. Id. at 22. "Children of African-American or never-married mothers were
particularly singled out unfairly for exclusion from the program." Id.
69. Pub. L. No. 100-485 (1988). See Chase-Lansdale & Vinovskis, supra note 56, at 25-29.
The Family Support Act was a watershed event in the child support collection arena. It was the
result of the efforts of President Reagan and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan who both shared an
interest in stronger child support efforts. Id at 25.
70. See CROWLEY, supra note 60, at 95.
71. Noted commentator Irwin Garfinkel wrote in 1998 that despite twenty years of increasing
tougher legislation, child support collections have not shown much improvement. See Irwin
Garfinkel, et al., Introduction to FATHERS UNDER FIRE, supra note 12, at 1, 3.
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reasons for fathers' non-compliance are diverse and complex72 and are
not addressed by Congress. Nevertheless, the public became convinced
that what was needed was more money from fathers. Adding fuel to the
fire was a popular book "claim[ing] that, after divorce, women's
standard of living declined by 73 percent while men's standard of living
increased by 42 percent."73 Despite being wrong, and acknowledged as
such by the author herself, these figures "have been convenient for
advocates and have become ingrained in both the popular culture and
academic circles." 74
Control of the debate also shifted. Until the 1960s, social workers
largely shaped the child support debate.75  "They proposed offering
mothers who received Aid to Families with Dependent Children
[(AFDC)] much more than cash assistance to support their children ...
and direct[ed] them to all of the in-kind benefits for which they
qualified, [including] job training and educational programs." 76 In the
1970s, conservatives increasingly occupied positions of power and they
began to shape the child support debate.77 This brought enforcement of
child support to the forefront, "with a single focus: welfare cost
recovery." As the number of female legislators grew in the 1980s,
we saw a change of focus back toward the family. Not only did strong
enforcement of child support obligations for families on welfare
continue, but coverage was expanded to non-welfare families. In the
case of non-welfare families, financial support was sent directly to the
family, instead of going first through the State.81
Today, we are seeing an increase of advocacy on behalf of
fathers.82 Such advocacy reflects greater concern for the father and
includes calls of forgiveness for arrearages, more equitable child support
guidelines and "a revamping of all state award formulas to reflect the
true cost of child rearing."83 Some states are already responding to these
72. See supra note 25.
73. Henry, supra note 35, at 140 (citing LENORE WEIZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION- THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA
(1985)).
74. Id.
75. See CROWLEY, supra note 60, at 28.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 29.
79. See id. at 29-30.
80. Id. at 30.
81. Id.
82. See Hatcher and Lieberman, infra note 153.
83. CROWLEY, supra note 60, at 30.
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concerns.84 It is not clear where the law will eventually settle on this
issue but it appears that the pendulum is swinging back to a more
reasoned approach. Finally, it is fair to say that the Obama
administration will probably tilt toward a more balanced view of the
problem. 85
C. Taxation ofDivorce and Child Benefits
Section 71 of the Internal Revenue Code gives preferential
treatment for alimony payments by granting an above-the-line
deduction for such payments but the recipient of this income has to
include alimonies paid into income under I.R.C. § 215. Child support
payments, on the other hand, are not allowed such preference; the reason
being that parents, in addition to having a legal and moral duty to take
care of their children, also have an inclination to do so. The inclination
to ensure the care of one's ex-spouse is rare and the reason for the
preference accorded to alimony payments is historical and no longer
relevant,87 yet, the preference remains. It has been argued that I.R.C. §
84. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. § 12-204 (West 2007) (amended 2011). Maryland
has a child support scheme that holds both parents responsible based on their adjusted annual
incomes. See id. § 12-204(a). Maryland provides a table mandating a level of expected child
expenditures depending on the parents' income. See id. § 12-204(e). Each parent is responsible to
pay an amount based on his/her percentage of the parents' combined income. See id. § 12-
204(a)(1). Adjustments are made if certain child expenses are paid solely by one parent;
adjustments are also made for the amount of time the child spends in each parent's home. See id. §
12-204(m). Finally, the calculation of child support is subject to court review. Even if one parent
does not work (unless physically or mentally unable to work), the Maryland scheme would assign
income to the non-working parent based on prior work history, availability of jobs in the area etc.
See id § 12-204(b). An example of how the Maryland approach works follows: Father and Mother
divorce; they each make $5000 per month. They have one child who stays with the mother full-
time. Based on their combined income, the expected combined amount of child support would be
$1040. See id. § 12-204(e). They would share this amount equally ($520 each). Hence, the non-
custodial father would have to pay the custodial mother $520 per month. Based on his hypothetical
income, this is a reasonable amount. If they shared joint custody and the child spends equal time
with both parents, neither would be liable for child support payments to the other.
Thirty-three states use the Maryland or income share approach. Fourteen use a flat
percentage of the non-custodial parent's income. Three states use what has been called the Melson
formula. Under this formula, an amount of money set at the poverty limit is set aside from the
payor's income before child support is deducted. This way, the payor will not dip below the
poverty line due to child support obligations. SPENCE, supra note 53, at 10-13.
85. See, e.g., Krissah Thompson, Obama Steps Up Fatherhood Advocacy With New
Mentoring Initiative, WASH. POST, June 21,2010, at A6.
86. Above-the-line deduction refers to the unrestricted use of a deduction. Other deductions
(not above the line) such as personal medical expenses are subject to limits.
87. Alimony deductions were enacted after World War II out of concerns that, coupled with
the high income tax rates enacted to fund the war, some payors would not be able to make their
alimony payments and still discharge their tax obligations. See Mombrun, supra note 15, at 231.
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71 is bad for children and its tax preference should be given instead for
child support payments. Moreover, it has been argued that granting a
deduction for alimony payments is an incentive in favor of divorce
which is necessarily bad for the household and causes impoverishment
of women. It has even been argued that mandatory cessation of
alimony payment upon death is an incentive to, at least, wish death
upon a former partner if not actively promoting her demise; after all,
statistics have shown that women are in greater danger of physical harm
during the divorce period.9 1 Well-advised taxpayers can take advantage
of I.R.C. § 71 since tax arbitrage is built into the section.92 This is yet
another area where the tax law tends to reward tax sophistication and
favor the wealthy taxpayer.
Tax benefits afforded parents can be broken into two main
categories: (a) tax benefits that can be claimed by either parent like the
dependency exemption and the child tax credit and (b) tax benefits that
can be claimed by only a specific parent, for example, the child care
credit and the parent's filing status such as head of household. 93  In
addition to reducing the claimant's tax, claiming a child as a dependent
can also significantly bolster a claim for the EITC,94 a potentially
significant source of income for low income taxpayers. 95  For the
88. See Michael Waggoner, IRC § 71 May Impoverish Children, Endanger Ex-Wives, and
Disrupt Federalism, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 574 (2008).
89. Id. at 575.
90. See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D).
91. See Waggoner, supra note 88, at 577-78.
92. Because alimony is deductible, divorcing taxpayers who are in different tax brackets
(payee is in a lower tax bracket than payor) have an incentive to disguise child support or other
payments as alimony. I.R.C. § 71(f) (the recapture rules) attempts to prevent such abuses by
reversing the benefits of the section (i.e., payee receives deduction and payor loses deduction) in
situations where there are excess alimony payments. The recapture rules, however, only apply for
the first three post-separation years and can be relatively easily avoided. Thus, it is well-known that
well-advised divorcing taxpayers can arrange their affairs to take advantage of the tax arbitrage
opportunities inherent in I.R.C. § 71 while poorly-advised or unadvised taxpayers do not. See
Deborah A. Geir, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Federal Income Tax Law Applicable to
Transfers in Divorce, 55 TAx LAW. 363, 364 (2002).
93. See Pearlene Anklesaria, Child Related Tax Breaks For Divorced Parents, 22 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 425,426-30 (2009).
94. Although the EITC was expanded in the 1990s to cover workers who do not have
children, its focus remains on working parents with children, hence a claimant without children gets
a credit of 7.65% of his income. If the claimant has one child, the benefit jumps to 34%. See I.R.C.
§ 32(b)(1)(A).
95. Saving low to moderate income taxpayers thousands of dollars, the EITC is an important
source of savings. There are claims that it has helped taxpayers put money down on a house, buy a
car or even go to college. See Neil Downing, Earned Income Tax Credit Can Break "Cycle Of
Poverty," R.I. NEWS, Jan. 26, 2010, available at
http://www.projo.com/news/contentlearnedincome credit campaign 01-26-
2011] 121
15
Mombrun: Shifting the Paradigm by Bringing Tax Arbitrage to the Lower Inco
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
wealthier taxpayer, a dependency exemption claim could allow her to
claim other credits such as Hope or lifetime learning credits. 9 Under
I.R.C. § 152, a dependent can be either a qualifying child or qualifying
relative.97 The section provides that a qualifying child will be a
dependent if the following five tests are met: (a) a relationship test, (b) a
residency test, (c) an age test, (d) a support test and (e) a filing test.
Where both parents can meet the tests and claim the child as a
dependent, the exemption goes to the parent with the highest income.99
Section 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code was amended to provide
specific divorce rules; essentially the IRS wanted to get out of the
business of refereeing disputes between divorced taxpayers and
Congress acquiesced to IRS concerns.100  Section 152(e) of the Internal
Revenue Code generally provides that, even in situations where the
residency or support test may not be met, taxpayers are allowed to
designate the non-custodial parent as the parent permitted to claim the
dependency exemption.' 0  This is clearly permissible tax arbitrage.
D. Challenges Facing the Child in a Separated Family
According to the Bureau of Census, "[c]hildren whose parents have
separated or divorced or whose parents have never married face
numerous difficulties that have the potential for temporary or even
10_ATH81 M_v8.3a66c74.htmhttp://www.projo.com/news/content/earnedincome-credit campaig
n_01-26-10 ATH81M v8.3a66c74.htm.
96. Under I.R.C. § 24(a) (the Hope and Lifetime Learning Tax Credits), taxpayers can take
credit for expenses of a college education for themselves and/or their dependents. These two credits
are not refundable; hence, they benefit only taxpayers who have a tax liability. The low income
taxpayer is unlikely to take advantage of these credits because the cumulative effect of his standard
personal exemption deductions and his EITC probably wipes out his tax liability.
97. See I.R.C. § 152(c)(1).
98. Id
99. See id. § 152(cX4)(B)(ii).
100. Under I.R.C. § 152(e), the IRS will not challenge an election made by the custodial parent
to grant the dependency exemption to the non-custodial parent notwithstanding that the non-
custodial parent could not have met the residency, the support test or the conflict resolution rules of
I.R.C. § 152(c)(4). The only requirement is that this allocation is made in writing and in an
appropriate format such as using Form 8332, Release/Revocation of Release of Claim to Exemption
for Child by Custodial Parent. This is one of the few areas where the individual taxpayer enjoys
near complete freedom.
101. I.R.C. § 152(e)(1). The ABA section on taxation helped in framing this particular rule by
urging the Congress to liberalize the rules for divorced taxpayers. The ABA also urged Congress to
enact a single definition for the term "child" but the Congress declined. See ABA Recommends
Simplfication Of Eligibility Requirements For Receiving A Dependency Exemption, 86 TNT 48-
140, Mar. 10, 1986.
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permanent harm.",102 Among the challenges are declines in family
income or the persistent low income of the single parent home typically
headed by a female.Io3 According to a 2007 survey, one quarter of all
children under the age of twenty-one (21.8 million) live with one
parent;104 hence, this problem is potentially devastating to our country.
In the African-American community, the statistics show that almost one
out of every two children live with a single parent. o0 Although child
support payments (when made) represent about half of the income for
custodial parents below the poverty line, only 46.8% of custodial parents
received their full payment due and an additional 29.5% received part
payment, with the remaining not receiving any payments. o0 Coupled
with the shrinking roll of welfare,107 it is clear that we are enhancing
opportunities for poverty.
Children's needs for emotional support may be as great as
economic support. It has been argued that "one dollar of child support is
worth $22 from another source." This is an extraordinary claim with
which many may disagree, but it is made with the knowledge that
monetary support typically signals increased visitation and emotional
support from the non-custodial parents. In fact, some courts view "the
obligations of support and visitation as interdependent and have allowed
the willful breach of one provision. . . to be remedied by the intentional
102. See J. Peterson & C. Nord, The Regular Receipt Of Child Support: A Multi-Step Process,
52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 539, 539 (1990). Among the problems the separated child faces is the low
income caused by the separation and the persistent low income of the typical single-parent
household. Id.
103. According to the Bureau of Census, in 2007, mothers accounted for 82.6% of single-
parent households. See TIMOTHY T. GRALL, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and their Child
Support: 2007, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 60-237,2 (2009), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-237.pdfhttp://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-
237.pdf.
104. Id.
105. Id. (explaining that 48.2% of all African-American children live in a single parent
household).
106. Id. at 1.
107. Id. at 5-6. (The participation of custodial parents in public assistance programs has
steadily declined over recent years from a high of 40.7 percent in 1993 to 28.4 percent in 2001.
With regard to TANF, the percentage fell from 22 percent to 4.3 percent).
108. See Sara S. McLanahan et al., Child Support Enforcement and Child Well-Being; Greater
Security or Greater Conflict?, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING, supra note 22, at 239,
249-50. This may be because by paying child support, the child benefits by "picking up some
unobserved characteristics of the father, such as 'family commitment' or the fact that child support
dollars have a symbolic value that enhances children's well-being." See Mombrun, supra note 15,
at 242 n.169.
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withholding of the other.",109 Lack of monetary support from the non-
custodial parent, on the other hand, may cause psychological harm to the
child."10
The separated child also has to navigate the emotidnal challenges
caused by separation and divorce. Clearly, it is critical for the child to
have an emotionally stable relationship with the custodial parent,' I' but
the child must also maintain a relationship with the non-custodial parent
and sometimes the two may not be compatible. This is due to our
adversarial system of divorce and separation which continues long after
the divorce or separation.112 To make matters worse, when courts get
involved, they do not necessarily make decisions that are in the best
interests of the child. For example, if a court suspends or reduces
visitation privileges in response to non-payment of child support, the
child may view his relationship with the non-custodial parent as
financially based rather than emotionally based.113  As argued below,
courts often do not take a holistic view of the child and may be mostly
interested in collecting past child support payments because custodial
parents have to turn over their child support claims to the government in
order to receive assistance. This appears to be the current trend in social
policy that government help should be based on "social reciprocity." 1 4
Under this policy, the government is owed half of the child support
payments in arrears, over $50 billion for 2006.115
To recoup this debt, the government has used all the tools in its
arsenal including imposing civil and criminal contempt citations for
failure to pay child support, causing some to argue that there has been a
109. See Carolyn Eaton Taylor, Making Parents Behave: The Conditioning Of Child Support
And Visitation Rights, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1061 (1984).
110. Id. at 1077-78. But see SUSAN MEYER, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND
CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES ( 1997).
111. Taylor, supra note 109, at 1066-67 ("Researchers studying the divorced family have
continually stressed the critical importance of an emotionally stable relationship between the child
and the custodial parent.").
112. Id.atn.169.
113. Id. at 1078.
114. Under the concept of reciprocity, something is expected from the individual in exchange
for help from the government. Examples include work requirement in welfare legislation. The
EITC is another example. See Donald Tobin, Investing In Our Children: A Not So Radical
Proposal, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 457, 472 (2004).
115. See Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests
of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1029 (2007). It may not
be possible to get an accurate handle on the true amount of child support in arrears because mothers
may not want to assign their rights to child support payments to the government due to fears of
violence. Id. at 1045. On the other hand, in-kind support from non-custodial parents is not easily
counted. Id. at 1046.
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silent return of debtor's prison1l6 and to question the constitutionality of
the government's actions. 117  This is not a holistic approach to the
problem because low income obligors have trouble getting access to
good paying jobs and sometimes fail to pay their child support
obligations due to larger issues of poverty. 11 Moreover, if the lower
income obligor owes $2.11 for every dollar earned,11 9 it is not possible
for the government to collect this debt. Imprisonment also leads to loss
of jobs and an even greater inability to pay one's debt. The cycle, thus,
begins again and the child is left attempting to overcome these
challenges for the rest of his life.120 Hence, although counterintuitive,
one commentator has argued that collecting child support from poor
fathers may make families poorer as fathers will stop making in-kind
contributions and will be forced into the underground economy. 21 This
commentator calls for giving separated mothers more responsibility for
dealing with fathers and predicts that this could lead to increased co-
habitation and marriage.' Increased enforcement, on the other hand,
only leads to increased violence.123 In sum, looking out for Mom and
Dad means looking out for the child.
E. Public vs. Private Responsibility for Raising Children
It costs about $233,000 to raise a child from birth to seventeen
years of age.124 If we add the additional costs of helping a child reach
young adulthood such as college or trade school expenses, buying that
first car and other ordinary life expenses, there is little doubt that having
children is a very expensive monetary responsibility for most
116. See Paterson, supra note 25.
117. See, e.g., Thomas C. Gabel, A Critical Analysis of the Child Support Recovery Act: Do
Deadbeat Dads have a Leg to Stand On After the Supreme Court's New Commerce Clause
Decision?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 353 (1996); Goulah, supra note 17; but see Mark R. Fondacaro &
Dennis P. Stolle, Revoking Motor Vehicle And Professional Licenses For Purposes Of Child
Support Enforcement: Constitutional Challenges And Policy Implications, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 355 (1996); Ronald S. Kornreich, The Constitutionality ofPunishing Deadbeat Parents: The
Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 After United States v. Lopez, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1089
(1995).
118. See Patterson, supra note 25, at 131.
119. Id.atl10n.99.
120. See Taylor, supra note 109, at 1078.
121. See Hatcher, supra note 115, at 1074-75.
122. Id. at 1083.
123. See Angela R. Fertig, Irwin Garfinkel, & Sara McLanahan, Child Support Enforcement
and Domestic Violence Among Non-Cohabiting Couples, I (Working Paper Ser., March 2006),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-895712.
124. Lepow, supra note 29, at 130.
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Americans. Who should bear the burden of raising children? Parents?
Societ.? Or a combination? Our society has clearly answered the
latter because we understand that when someone else's child
discovers the cure for cancer or a vaccine for AIDS or builds a
Microsoft, or joins the Navy, or becomes a good citizen, we all
ultimately benefit.126 Hence, tax breaks for children have been
embraced by both the right and the left as a good investment in
children.127 The debate is really a matter of degree. Conservatives tend
to argue for imposing more of the burden on the individual and liberals
(or moderates) tend to clamor for more of a government role.128 Hence,
regarding government investment in children, liberals or progressives
support such investment because it has societal value while
conservatives view this as a "'socially beneficial private investment."'
1 29
Reflecting society's views, our laws also reflect our obligations to
children through the doctrine of parens patriae.130
Our current tax system allows tax breaks for children based on both
a tax internal (ability to pay) and external argument (societal benefit). 131
Because more than one taxpayer can claim eligibility for the dependency
exemption it has engendered friction between parents.132 To lessen the
friction a commentator has argued that the dependency deduction could
be divided equally between the parents.133 Such change would, of
course, require legislative action, and, although a step in the right
direction, this would not address the fundamental problem of refusal to
125. Even though more could be done for the poor, social spending in the United States "has
increased almost every year since the late 1960s," During the last four decades, social spending has
gone from $88 billion to over $500 billion, an increase in real dollars and as a percentage of total
government spending and Gross Domestic Product. See Ron Haskins, The Moynihan Report
Revisited: Lessons and Reflections After Four Decades: Moynihan was Right: Now What?, 621
ANNALS 281, 292 (2009).
126. Lawrence Zelenak, Children and the Income Tax, 49 TAX L. REV. 349, 358, 388-89
(1994). This is based on a tax external argument, that is, the benefit society gains from giving
preference to some behavior by providing a tax break. Id at 388. It has been argued that families
with children should receive tax allowances because of "the positive externalities of well-behaved
children and the negative externalities of poorly-cared-for ones." Id. at 358.
127. Id. at 388.
128. Id. at 388-89.
129. Id.
130. See Taylor, supra note 109, at 1071. (starting under the doctrine of parens patriae, the
court is empowered "to protect the best interests of the child.").
131. Zelenak, supra note 126, at 357.
132. Lepow, supra note 29, at 132.
133. Id. at 174. Commentators in the past have called for such a solution. See also Paul D.
Lagomarcino, The Divorced Husband and the Dependency Exemption Mirage: An Outline of the
Problem and of a Statutory Corrective Procedure, 12 TAX L. REV. 85, 95 (1956-57).
134. Lepow, supra note 29, at 183.
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pay child support, low child support payments, or inability to make
payments. Another commentator has argued that we shift our attention
toward helping marriages and toward saving "'good enough'
marriages" 1 because marriage should be the preferred institution for
raising children and this would lessen the negative impact of divorce.136
Although this is a sensitive position, it is not clear what government
policy would be effective in reversing the current divorce rate. Although
the commentator did not specifically call for enactment of a new
government policy,137 under the current political climate, it is
questionable that such a policy could be enacted.
III. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
The Family Support Act of 1998 signaled a change in societal
attitude toward focusing on parents who do not meet their child support
responsibilities and obtaining payment from them. Following passage of
the Act, the government increased the pressure on these parents. As the
major financier of child support, 39 the government wants to protect its
interest and has decided on imposing tough sanctions for failure to fulfill
child support requirements as a solution to the problem. When parents
tried to skirt their child support responsibilities by moving out of state,
the federal government responded by passing the Child Support
Recovery Act (CSRA) which criminalized the relocation of a parent who
is delinquent in child support payments.140 Congress relied on the
Commerce Clause to pass the CRSA,141 but commentators disagree
whether the CSRA is constitutional.142 The effectiveness of the CSRA
is questionable because eighteen months following passage of the act
only five cases had been prosecuted under it.143 This may have been
because of the challenge of proving (as required by the Act) that the
135. See Coverdale, supra note 1, at 506.
136. Id. at 479-83.
137. See id. at 505-06.
138. Supra note 70.
139. See Tobin, supra note 114, at 489.
140. The CSRA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 666 (1990), and its purpose is to remove the
incentive for non-custodial parents to evade their child support obligations by moving out of state.
See Patterson, supra note 25, at 358.
141. See Kornreich, supra note 117, at 1089.
142. See Gabel, supra note 117 (arguing that the CSRA is unconstitutional); see also
Kornreich, supra note 117 (arguing that the CSRA is constitutional).
143. Gabel, supra note 117, at 358.
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parent willfully moved out of state to avoid child support payments.144
To complicate matters, some courts have also invalidated the CSRA.145
In addition to using the court system, the government is also using
administrative measures such as revoking driver's licenses.146  This
route appears to be one of the more effective tools used by the
government because it is more efficient and the likelihood of using the
court system is low.147 Moreover, this raises few constitutional concerns
because the right to drive is not seen as a fundamental constitutional
right.148  If the parents who are delinquent in child support payments
decide to drive without a license, then the government might "boot" 49
their cars; send them birthday cards reminding them of their kids'
birthdays, post their pictures on a most wanted list or even order a ban
on procreation.150  As stated earlier, these tactics have largely failed
because the main reason a parent fails to pay his or her child support
payments is that he or she does not have adequate money to do so.
Jailing the parent is particularly offensive and inefficient because jails
are overcrowded and the parent is often quickly released. ' The system
is also fraught with errors 52 and does not take in-kind contributions into
consideration. In sum, the family court system charged with
preservation of the family is ripping the family apart and is ripe for
changes.153
144. See Kornreich, supra note 119, at 1097. One suggestion to avoiding this constitutional
crisis is to simply give the IRS the power to collect child support orders. Being a federal agency,
the IRS can follow the delinquent anywhere he goes. See Jonathon Jemison, Collecting and
Enforcing Child Support Orders with the Internal Revenue Service: An Analysis of a Novel Idea, 20
WOMEN'S RTS L. REP. 137, 137 (1999).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 368-69 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd sub
nom., United States v. Mussari, 95 F. 3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp.
1360, 1368 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F. 3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bailey, 902 F.
Supp 727, 730 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 115 F. 3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Parker,
911 F. Supp 830, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev'd, 109 F. 3d 28 (3d Cir. 1997).
146. See Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 117, at 362. This appears to be the modem trend and
is encouraged by the federal government in an effort to lessen reliance on the court system which
can be more costly and less efficient.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 379.
149. A car boot is a device that immobilizes a vehicle; it consists of a clamp that surrounds the
wheel of a vehicle and that prevents both the clamp and the wheel to be removed. It is most often
used by parking departments of big cities as an effective tool to collect unpaid parking fees.
150. See Goulah, supra note 17, at 486.
151. Id.at488-89.
152. Id. at 496.
153. Id. at 502-04. The author suggests several improvements to the system such as: (a)
automatic adjustments to child support payments under certain circumstances such as illness of the
non-custodial parent, (b) adoption of the presumption of joint custody, (c) calculations of child
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Some believe the problem lies in the custodial parent not receiving
enough child support payments and call for automatic cost of living
adjustments for the recipient parent.154 This may prove to be a
disincentive for work1 55 and does not address the root cause of the
problem: the non-custodial parent's inability to pay. Others call for an
increase in human capital investment such as spending $2000 per year
on each child under the age of fifteen.156 It is argued that the return for
this investment will exceed 10 percent and, hence, worth the risk.'5 7
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the current Congress has either the
stomach or the means to carry out such a program.
IV. Is TAXPAYER SELF-HELP THE ONLY WAY OUT?
A. Economic Policy
Government social and tax policies are necessarily driven by
economic policy and the public fisc because ultimately someone (the
taxpayer) has to pay for government expenditures. The types of
economic policy that we follow signal our priorities, or at least our
support payments based on the true cost of raising children, (d) reduction of errors, (e) repeal the
Bradley amendment which prohibits the modification of child support arrearages and (f) institution
of programs to help poor fathers obtain meaningful employment. Id. See also Daniel L. Hatcher &
Hannah Lieberman, Breaking the Cycle of Defeat for Non-custodial Parents Through Advocacy, 37
J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 5 (2003) (claiming that the child support system is broken).
154. See J. Thomas Oldham, Abating The Feminization of Poverty: Changing The Rules
Governing Post-Decree Modification ofChild Support Obligations, 1994 BYU L. Rev. 841, 849-50
(1994). The author correctly claims that expressing child support payment as a fixed amount erodes
its purchasing power due to inflation and, thus, puts the burden on the recipient of the award.
Modification of child support payments is a solution in theory but it is burdensome on a practical
basis. Hence, the author calls for automatic Cost of Living Adjustments (COLA) and notes that
courts have been supportive of this approach.
155. Id. at 861. If the obligor of child support payments is forced to share any increases in
wages with his ex-partner in the form of increased child support payments, he may not see any real
value in increasing his efforts at work.
156. See Tobin, supra note 114, at 459-60. The author claims that such programs will be more
effective than other social programs because if the payments are made directly to children, there is a
greater chance they will be spent on children. The author also claims that recent social programs
mandate significant restrictions on parents and when they run afoul of these restrictions, families
lose these benefits.
157. Id. at 463. The author compares his program with the negative income tax as advocated
by famed economist Milton Friedman and finds that his program is less monumental and may be
more effective than Friedman's program because he (Friedman) proposed the negative income tax
30 years ago and no progress has been made. Not directly rejecting Friedman's call, the author
suggests that his proposal may be a small step in that direction. Id. at 496. The negative income tax
concept is basically a subsistence allocation formula with a refundable feature. Thus, if it is set at
$10,000, a person with no income will receive $10,000 from the government and a person with a
$100,000 income and a $30,000 tax liability will only pay $20,000 in tax. Id. at 495.
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leaders' priorities. Today, we appear to be in the throes of
Obamanomics as Reaganomics and the trickle down economic theory
are beginning to be discredited. 158 The now preferred bottom up theory
of economics appears to be lookin to education, health care and
infrastructure for economic growth. The middle class should benefit
from this shift in priorities as public investment increases. 1o President
Obama also appears to have a better opportunity than his democratic
predecessor, Bill Clinton, to focus on public investment.16 His
supporters are taking up the mantle and are urging him to reverse course
on Rea anomics. With victories in healthcare and financial
reform, he appears to be heeding their calls. With regard to policies
on children, at the micro economic level, commentators are arguing that
families are not pooling their income as one would suspect, and that
children do better when more income is shifted to women.166 The
Obama administration may not be advocating for a gender specific
economic policy but their bottom up approach should be beneficial to
women and even some in the upper class who appears to be revolting
against the extremely rich.167
158. See Reich, A Short Primer, supra note 40.
159. Id
160. Id.
161. Id According to Professor Reich, this is because Clinton presided over an expanding
economy when assets were needed to feed the expansion; Obama, on the other hand, inherited a
recession and needs to create a boom. Hence, government spending will be the key to getting the
economy moving again. Id.
162. See Alan Brinkley, This is Our Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, at BR7. Mr. Brinkley
reviewed three books written by supporters of Obama: (1) A Long Time Coming-The Inspiring,
Combative 2008 Campaign and the Historic Election of Barack Obama, by Evan Thomas, (2) The
Plan-Big Ideas for Change in America, by Rahm Emmanuel and Bruce Reed, and (3)
Obamanomics-How Bottom-Up Prosperity Will Replace Trickle Down Economics, by John R.
Talbott. All three books are hostile to Reagan-era economic policies.
163. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act represents a
major reform of health care in this country and will allegedly cover most of Americans.
164. See Kara Rowland, Historic Wall Street Reform Signed, WASH. TIMES, July 23, 2010.
165. See Shelly J. Lundberg, Robert A. Pollak & Terence J. Wales, Do Husbands and Wives
Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom, 32 J. HUM. RESOURCES 463, 479
(1997). The authors conclude that families do not pool their income and that when resources are
allocated to women, they (women) and children benefit. This means that men tend to keep
resources to themselves. This is an important finding and should help government devise social
policies that are more efficient and more responsive to the needy.
166. Id.
167. See Matt Miller, Goldman Sachs and the Revolt of the Lower Upper Class, WASH. POST,
Apr. 23, 2010. This article chronicles the resentment being built up among doctors, accountants,
engineers and lawyers as they realize that a super rich class is being created with income levels that
dwarfs theirs. The article points out that the upper lower class feels cheated when they are
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B. Tax Policy
The early report on President Obama's shift in tax policy appears to
be favoring the middle income taxpayer.168 However, most would admit
that President Obama has not taken bold action regarding taxes and we
are arguably still saddled with two tax codes, one for the rich and one for
the not so rich.169 Whichever tax code you fall under, it is clear that the
code is complex and getting more challenging. Albert Einstein may
have been right-the hardest thing in the world to understand may be the
income tax code. 170  This complexity has caused administrative
problems and has bred cynicism. 171  In addition to income tax
simplification, there have been calls to reform the income tax such as
replacing it with a value added tax, a flat tax and a national retail sales
tax.172 To date, none of these proposals appears have a serious chance
of being enacted. Although it would help lower income taxpayers, tax
simplification does not appear to have a constituency. 173 This may be
due to the lack of tax sophistication on the part of low income taxpayers,
but tax sophistication should not be a requirement to getting a slice of
the economic pie.174 Commentators have called for more specific
changes in tax policy such as combining the household credits into one
unified credit which will, in addition to simplifying the tax laws, reduce
work disincentive and decrease the need for other welfare provisions. 175
Other suggestions include giving parents a deduction for the costs of
raising children or splitting the income of families based on the family
scrapping by "on a million or two--or God forbid, $300,000" when "people no smarter or better
than [them] are making $10 million or $50 million or $100 million in a single year." Id.
168. See Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and the Obama Tax Plan, 86 DEN. U.L. REV. 575,
577-81 (2009). In the article, Professor Brown highlights some of the Obama tax ideas that will
benefit the middle class such as (1) a automatic enrollment in employer-funded retirement systems,
(2) implementation of a refundable mortgage deduction, and (3) an expansion of the EITC.
169. See Dorothy A. Brown, Two Americas, Two Tax Codes, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 8,2009.
170. Simran Khurana, Funny Tax Quotes That Unravel the Mystery of Income Tax,
ABoUT.COM,
http://quotations.about.com/od/moretypes/altaxquotesl.htmhttp://quotations.about.com/od/moretype
s/a/taxquotesl.htmhttp://quotations.about.com/od/moretypes/a/taxquotesl.htm (last visited Sept. 1,
2010).
171. See Michael J. Graez, A Fair and Balanced Tax System for the 21st Century, American
Enterprise Institute ( 2005), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050607_Graetz.pdf.
172. Id.
173. See Schenk, supra note 22, at 123.
174. Id. at 126-27.
175. See C. Eugene Steurle, Combining Child Credits, the EITC, and the Dependent
Exemption-Part Two: The Various Rationales, TAX ANALYSTS (2000).
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members spending the income.176 As argued above, it is doubtful that
the current political climate would permit an expansion of social
programs.
One of the few successes of social policy engineered through the
tax code is the EITC, a program supported by both Democrats and
Republicans that reaches 80% of low income earners.178 Anecdotal
successes include reports of the EITC helping taxpayers put down
money on a house, buy a car or even go to college.' 79 Nevertheless, the
EITC could be made more efficient because it is essentially a transfer
from the worker to the government and back to the worker. 18 Also, due
to its complexity, most workers have to hire a tax preparer in order to
secure the benefits of the credit, and millions of workers simply do
not take advantage of the credit notwithstanding measures taken by the
IRS to publicize it.182 One way to fix this problem is to enable IRS
computers to alert it of taxpayers who qualify but do not apply for the
credit.183
Building on the relative success of the EITC in providing money to
the working American, it has been suggested that it can be used to help
the non-custodial parent gain additional funds to support his or her
children. For instance, the IRS could treat him or her as if he or she has
a child for EITC purposes, or give half of or the entire credit to him or
her if the custodial parent does not qualify for the credit, or giving him
half of the credit. 4 Of course, this generous extension of benefits
would be available only if the parent is current on his or her child
support payments, a sensible approach that would incentivize the non-
176. See Allan J. Samansky, Tax Policy and the Obligation to Support Children, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 329 (1996).
177. See Theriot, supra note 45, at 130.
178. Id. at 131. The EITC is a refundable federal income tax credit for low to moderate income
working individuals and families. Congress originally approved the program in 1975 in part to
offset the burden of social security taxes and to provide an incentive to work. EITC Home Page-
It's easier than ever to find out if you qualify,
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96406,00.html (last visited May 4, 2011).
179. See Downing, supra note 95.
180. See Theriot, supra note 45, at 134.
181. Id. at 133.
182. See infra note 256.
183. See Theriot, supra note 45, at 135-36.
184. See Laura Wheaton & Elaine Sorensen, Non-custodial Parents, Child Support, and the
Earned Income Tax Credit, THE URBAN INSTIfUTE, Nov. 28, 1997, available at
http://www.urban.org/publications/407347.html.
185. Id. at 26.
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custodial parent to work and also to make his or her child support
payment.
C The Government's True Priority-Big Business
The tax breaks granted to big business are legendary.187 The
rationale for these tax breaks is that what is good for business is good for
America. Therefore, when insurance giant AIG was in danger of failing,
the government quickly pumped $173 billion into AIG's coffers.1 88  In
response, AIG executives spent millions on bonuses and retreats.19 The
government threatened action, but none is forthcoming. 19 After all,
these are highly trained and highly paid executives and they need their
bonuses to keep up their summer homes. Had it been low income
taxpayers instead of a financial giant found violating tax rules, the
government would have likely applied a harsh punishment. 19  What if
the troubled company is a banking giant like Wachovia? The
government quickly found money to bail them out. Hence, executives
186. Id. at 50.
187. I.R.C. § 162 is the grandfather of all federal income tax breaks and offers businesses an
above the line deduction for any expense imaginable. The rationale for the tax break is to
incentivize businesses to spend money. It has been argued that the incentive is not needed because
businesses only spend money when it benefits them. Hence, a business would rather lose a tax
break if this means, overall, greater savings. States also offer tax breaks to businesses to either
attract them or prevent them from seeking greener pastures, but it has been argued that these tax
breaks decrease overall welfare and only benefit a few. See Thomas J. Holmes, Analyzing a
Proposal to Ban State Tax Breaks to Businesses, 19 FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS 29, 31 (1995).
188. See Tracy A. Thomas, Bailouts, Bonuses, and the Return of Unjust Gains, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 437, 438 (2009-10).
189. Id.at437.
190. Congress responded to the AIG extravagance by attempting to pass several bills that
would have restrained such excesses but they were all defeated. Id. at 440. The government could
have recaptured the money squandered by AIG executives using several contractual and other
theories such as restitution, partial rescission, constructive trust, and accounting for profits. Id. at
441-46. New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo threatened to release the names of
executives who received bonuses; to almost no avail (a few executives returned their bonuses). See
Cuomo Wins Ruling to Name Merrill Bonus Recipients, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/19/business/19cuomo.html. It is fair to say that there has been
little accountability for the billions in government funds that were given to businesses under the
guise of "too big to fail" and that no punishment is forthcoming with respect to misuse of funds.
See Steven Pearse, Accounting for the Lack of Accountability: The Great Depression Meets the
Great Recession, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 409, 426 (2009-10).
191. Under I.R.C. § 32(k), if a taxpayer makes a fraudulent or reckless claim, the taxpayer
could be denied the use of the EITC for up to ten years. With the EITC representing a significant
portion of a low income taxpayer's income, this is a significant penalty. It is quite telling that the
Congress is willing to be harsh with the low income taxpayer and yet does not have the stomach to
recoup government funds from millionaires and billionaires.
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are rewarded in good times and protected from failure.192 This is, of
course nothing new. Chrysler was bailed out in 1979 and again in
2009.' It is fair to say that big business (especially big banking) has
always had a special seat in government.194
To get the full protection required, a company only has to be "too
big to fail".195 This new economic theory, reminiscent of the "domino
theory"'196 used by then Secretary of State Kissinger and others to
rationalize the Vietnam war, stands for the proposition that the failure of
some companies would be disastrous to the economy; hence, the
government should prevent their collapse at all costs. The government
takes quick action when it comes to big business, legislation is passed
overnight and budgetary concerns are no obstacle.197  Concerns
regarding the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),198 (the too big to
fail legislation) such as its delegation of power being unconstitutional
and its lack of accountability,1 99 and the lax ethics that allow a revolving
door between the Federal Reserve Bank and the private sector, and
192. See Tim Fernholz, The Myth of Too Big to Fail, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Oct. 28, 2009,
available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article-the-mythof too big to fail.
193. See Richard W. Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics When
Government Pays the Tab, 41 MCGEORGE L. REv. 131, 138 (2009-20 10).
194. In 1907, J.P. Morgan acted as a national bank for the US government because it did not
have a national bank. In subsequent years, Treasury officials were borrowing from private banks
such as Andrew Mellon from Mellon Bank, William Simon from Salomon Brothers, Donald Regan
from Merryl Lynch, and most recently, Robert Rubin and Henry Paulson from Goldman Sachs. Id.
at 140-41.
195. AIG qualified as too big to fail because it was feared that its failure would trigger a
"cataclysmic domino effect" that could endanger the entire U.S. financial sector. See Thomas,
supra note 190, at 437. The financial crisis that was the precursor to the government bailout was
blamed on the irresponsible subprime lending market. For a description of how this type of lending
worked, see Frederick Tung, The Great Bailout of2008-09, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 333 (2008).
196. Under this cold war theory, it was believed that the then Soviet Union intended to extend
its influence one country at a time and that if one country in Asia fell to communism, this would
trigger the fall of the next country and so on, like dominoes. The United States and its allies had to
stop this domino effect and they decided to make their stand with Vietnam. President Dwight D.
Eisenhower gave credence to this theory in a press conference on April 7, 1954 by referring to it.
See President Eisenhower's News Conference, Apr. 7, 1954, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1954,
p. 382, available at http://www.mtholyoke.edulacadlintrel/pentagon/ps I .htm.
197. See Pearse, supra note 190, at 410.
198. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
199. See Pearse, supra note 190, at 419.
200. See Painter, supra note 193, at 140-41. Federal Reserve Bank officials have been accused
of taking gifts and socializing with the bankers they are examining and of giving their resumes to
banks they were examining. The list of regulatory problems goes on. See Robert D. Auerbach, The
Fed's Backroom Bailout Policy, 12 CHAP. L. REv. 535, 539 (2008). A commentator argued that the
response to the current financial crisis (more regulations) will not be adequate because underlying
the crisis is a lack of moral virtue. The author argues that underlying moral-cultural trends that gave
rise to the financial crisis must be addressed by the "cultivation of intangible capital assets such as
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that it (the Federal Reserve Bank) is becoming a fourth branch of the
government,201 are no match for political money.202 The Obama
administration was able to push through healthcare reform because it
was tied to economic reform and the Democrats enjoyed a large majority
in both houses of Congress. Purely social programs such an expansion
of the EITC or new tax credits for children are not in the horizon. Any
improvement of the economic and therefore social and psychological
condition203 of the separated child will have to be done in the margin by
his parents. Hence, the time is ripe for an increase in tax arbitrage, after
all billions of dollars are at stake.
D. Tax Arbitrage
Ideally, the income tax system should play little to no role in bona
fide transactions. If a tax benefit is the driving force in a transaction,
then the transaction is probably a tax shelter and should be attacked
accordingly.205 If the transaction is not driven by the tax system but if
the taxpayer is merely using the tax system to enhance the transaction,
this may be permissible tax planning. Tax arbitrage generally exists
when "deductions and income related to the same transaction are treated
differently." 206 The connection between tax arbitrage and tax shelters is
reputational and social capital" and our thinking "needs to be more sensitive to the complexity of
the relationship between ethics and economics and more attuned to the importance of trust, truth,
and transparency." Kevin T. Jackson, The Scandal Beneath the Financial Crisis: Getting a View
From a Moral-Cultural Mental Model, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 736, 739 (2010).
201. See Henry S. Cohn, In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke's War on the Great Panic, BOOK
REvIEwS (2009) (reviewing DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE'S WAR ON THE
GREAT PANIC (2009)). Mr. Wessell argues that Ben Bernanke's attitude of "whatever it takes" has
turned the Federal Reserve Bank into a fourth branch of government. Id.
202. See Painter, supra note 193, at 139.
203. See Taylor, supra note 109, at 1077-78.
204. See infra note 229.
205. The IRS has attacked the use of tax shelters for years and has recently taken a different
tactic, preferring to require taxpayers to disclose transactions that qualify as tax shelters. If the
taxpayer fails to disclose these transactions, then the taxpayer will be subject to severe penalties.
There are six major transactions that the IRS requires to be registered: (1) listed transactions, (2)
confidential transactions, (3) transactions with contractual protection, (4) loss transactions, (5)
transactions with a significant book/tax difference, and (6) transactions involving a brief asset
holding period. For more information, see Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4, 301.6011 -lT et. seq.
206. W. Eugene Seago & Edward J. Schnee, Determining Interest Expense Incurred by
Affiliated Corporations to Earn Tax-Exempt Income, 102 J. TAX'N 299, 299 (2005). Examples of
tax arbitrage include borrowing money to purchase tax-exempt bonds and even leasing a piece of
equipment. This is because the interest paid on the borrowed money to buy the tax-exempt bond is
deductible while the interest received on the bond is not includable in income. In the lease example,
the taxpayer gets a deduction for his lease payments, hence, he might be willing to pay more for the
equipment while leasing it as opposed to buying it.
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clear but not every tax arbitrage is considered a tax shelter.207 As I will
explain below, the IRS has even blessed tax arbitrage in the separated
family context.
E. Arbitrage by Tax-Exempt Entities-Hospitals and Colleges
Congress is currently grappling with tax arbitrage transactions by
non-profit hospitals and colleges.2 8 While not trying to avoid tax
liability, these entities are using their tax-exempt status to bolster
income, for example by borrowing money in the tax-exempt bond
market at a low rate and investing this borrowed money in higher
yielding investments.209 According to the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), in 2007 such schemes bolstered non-profit hospitals income by
$1.8 billion, a significant sum compared with their overall tax-exempt
status valued at $2.5 billion. 21 Hospitals counter that the CBO study is
fundamentally flawed as it assumes that all cash on hand held by
hospitals could be used to finance projects and, thus, presumes that such
cash, when retained, is used for arbitrage purposes when hospitals
borrow to finance projects.211 Hospitals point out that their bond ratings
are partly based on cash on hand and the lower amount of cash on hand,
the lower the bond rating and, thus, the higher interest a hospital would
pay on borrowed funds. Such argument, however, does not explain
enough cash on hand to pay for 38,000 days of operations.213 Under a
broadened definition of tax arbitrage, the financial picture for the federal
government would improve as "hospitals would have to reduce their new
issues of tax-exempt bonds," necessarily saving the government
money.214 As typical of its studies, the CBO did not make a
recommendation, instead it left unanswered whether a broader definition
of tax arbitrage for hospitals would bring more market efficiency as the
advantage of non-profit hospitals over for-profit hospitals narrow or
207. See infra note 224.
208. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Senator Questions Another Tax Break for Colleges: Tax-Exempt
Bonds, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 2,2010.
209. See Becket Cinda, Clash on Hand, 37 MOD. HEALTHCARE 40, 42 (Mar. 25, 2007) (Issue
10).
210. Id.
211. Id. Under the CBO methodology, if a hospital's assets exceed its bonds, this is
tantamount to tax arbitrage.
212. Id. This would mean higher costs of capital to the disadvantage of the hospital.
213. CONG. BUDGET OFF., Nonprofit Hospitals and Tax Arbitrage, atl4 (2006), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7696/12-06-HospitalTax.pdf.
214. Id. at 3.
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whether this would be damaging to some non-profit hospitals as a cost
capital differential is created among non-profit hospitals.
Under the CBO study, 80% of bonds provided by hospitals could
be considered tax arbitrage.216 Regarding colleges, the figure jumps to
100%,217 and the amounts involved are more staggering-$5.5 billion in
tax arbitrage savings and $6.6 billion in tax exemption savings.218 Even
with this apparent total immersion in tax arbitrage, Congress does not
appear ready to do anything about the problem, beyond issuing press
releases.219 Section 148 of the Internal Revenue Code prevents direct
tax arbitrage in the bond setting and attempts to prevent indirect tax
arbitrage22 but the section is relatively easy to evade because money is
fungible. Moreover, the section's main rule in preventing indirect tax
arbitrage (the replacement proceed rules) is very difficult to enforce. 221
Outside the non-profit arena, some argue that tax arbitrage is not
widespread beyond the financial sector. The evidence, however,
appears to the contrary. States appear to heavily engage in tax
arbitrage,223 and individuals and businesses can engage in tax arbitrage
without even knowing it.224 Tax arbitrage is pervasive and it arguably
fuels tax shelters.225
F. Permissible Tax Arbitrage
As argued above, the likelihood for increased social benefits in the
near future is bleak. The separated child, in the meantime, continues to
suffer from the economic, social and psychological burden of his
215. Id. at 21-22.
216. Id. at 15.
217. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., Tax Arbitrage by Colleges and Universities, at 16 (2010),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/112xx/docl1226/04-30-TaxArbitrage.pdf [hereinafter
College Tax Arbitrage].
218. Id. at 2.
219. See Blumenstyk, supra note 208.
220. I.R.C. § 148.
221. See College Tax Arbitrage, supra note 202, at 7. See also § 148(a), which provides that a
bond will be treated as an arbitrage bond if the issuer intentionally uses any portion of the proceeds
in a prohibited manner.
222. See Merle Erickson, Austan Goolsbee & Edward Maydew, How Prevalent is Tax
Arbitrage? Evidence from the Market for Municipal Bonds (2002), available at
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edulaustan.goolsbee/research/munis.pdf.
223. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Arbitrage and the Savings Behavior of State Governments, 72
REv. ECON. & STAT. 390 (1990), available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/restat/v72yl990i3p390-
96.html.
224. See C. Eugene Seurle, Defining Tax Shelters and Tax Arbitrage, TAX POL'Y CENTER
(2002), 6, available at http://www.urban.org/publications/1000949.html.
225. Id. 17.
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family's separation.226 Ultimately, our whole society suffers. An
increase in child support payment is one way to alleviate this suffering
and increasing tax arbitrage among separated couples is an efficient way
to do it. This is potentially effective because the average value of child
related benefits is $1500 while the average yearly amount of child
support payments that a single parent receives is $1449.227 Moreover
parents routinely forego more than $6 billion in tax arbitrage benefits.229
Worse, evidence suggests that the use of tax arbitrage is higher among
the higher income, reflecting greater tax sophistication.229 The evidence
also proves that, on a consistent basis, the non-custodial parent would
benefit more from claiming the children as dependents, and the whole
family would benefit if these enhanced benefits are shared.230 More
importantly, evidence shows that non-custodial parents who claim
children as dependents pay 16% more in child support payments.231
Additionally, the evidence also suggests that the likelihood of payments
increase when separated parents enter into a voluntary agreement. 232
The real benefit will be increased visitation by the non-custodial parent
and an increased commitment to the children.23
The low income taxpayer may not engage in tax arbitrage due to
high transactional costs. There is no reason to believe that the higher
income family does not share these same transactional costs, yet, they
take better advantage of tax arbitrage.235 The key factor seems to be the
lack of tax sophistication on the part of the low income taxpayer and, as
226. See supra note 1 (arguing that the child benefits socially, economically, and
psychologically when she is part of a two-parent family, otherwise, she suffers).
227. See Looney, supra note 39, at 2.
228. Id. at 4.
229. In a prior work, Mr. Looney calculated that if all custodial mothers claim all children, the
net tax savings would be $7.9 billion. If non-custodial fathers claim them instead, the net tax
savings would be $15.3 billion. Of this tax arbitrage potential, he also calculated that only about $1
billion is used, and mostly by parents with higher income. See Mombrun, supra note 15, at note
39.
230. See Looney, supra note 39, at 11-12.
231. Id. at 3.
232. See Peterson & Nord, supra note 102, tbls.3 & 4.
233. Evidence suggests a link between increased payments and visitation. See Robert I.
Lerman & Elaine Sorensen, Child Support: Interactions Between Private and Public Transfers 45,
38 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 8199, 2001), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8199.
234. See Looney, supra note 39, at 4. Such transactional costs allegedly include a high
emotional cost or the role of violence or threatened violence and lack of tax sophistication. There is
no reason to believe to believe that the higher income taxpayer who takes better advantage of the
available tax arbitrage does not encounter similar transactional costs; the difference is their higher
tax sophistication.
235. See id.
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discussed below, this can be remedied. More importantly, tax
sophistication should not be a requirement to taking advantage of a
favorable policy granted by Congress.236
G. States get into the Act
State judges are aware of the economic benefits of the dependency
exemption and have used its allocation to enhance child support
payments.237 Some judges believe that:
The facts of life are that income tax exemptions are valuable only to
persons with income, and up to a certain point, the higher the income
the more valuable exemptions become . . . [c]onsequently, it seems
only reasonable that a trial judge should allocate the dependency
exemption to the parent in the highest tax bracket, and then enhance
(or reduce) the value of the cash child support payments to offset the
238
value of the exemption.
Other judges state the same proposition in even stronger language:
"We hold that a tax dependency exemption is nearly identical in nature
to an award of child support or alimony and is thus capable of being
modified as an order of support.' 2 39  These judges rely on the best
interests of the child doctrine for their decisions to decide whom to
allocate the dependency deduction to. The dependency exemption being
a federal benefit, judges understand that they cannot singularly assign
the deduction to the non-custodial parent even when this would benefit
the whole family. They get around this technicality by requiring the
custodial parent to sign over the dependency exemption or face a
contempt citation. 24 Some judges do not choose to use their contempt
power in this manner but choose instead to take the dependency
236. See supra note 40.
237. State judges have generally taken the following three positions with regard to the
allocation of the dependency exemption granted by I.R.C. § 151: (1) the section does not prevent a
judge from allocating the dependency exemption, (2) the section does not prohibit allocation of the
exemption and the use of the state judge's contempt power to require that the custodial parent sign
over the allocation to the non-custodial parent, and (3) the section pre-empts the authority of the
state judge. For an exhaustive list of cases on the issue, see Gavin L. Phillips, State Court's
Authority, in Marital or Child Custody Proceeding to Allocate Federal Income Tax Dependency
Exemption for Child to Non-custodial Parent under 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code 26
U.S.C.A. 152(e), 77 A.L.R.4th 786 (2009), at *3-5.
238. Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449,459-460 (W. Va. 1987).
239. Hall v. Hall, 472 N.W.2d 217, 221 (Neb. 1991).
240. See, e.g. Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766, 770-780 (Miss. 1989).
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exemption into account in determining child support payments. 241
Hence, the custodial parent will be indirectly punished if she refuses to
allow the non-custodial parent the use of the dependency exemption
when requested by the judge. Some judges believe that assignment of
the dependency exemption is an encroachment on federal power and,
therefore, will not take the forced assignment of the dependency
exemption into account in calculating child support payments.242 The
majority of judges, however, permit this assignment because if it is not
done, the winner will be the federal government and the loser will be the
child.2 43
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The problems faced by the separated child are severe and must be
addressed for the good of society. Doing nothing does not appear to be a
viable option. The states have already fashioned a solution to the
problem and they should be encouraged to continue to do so. The IRS
has recently provided regulations addressing this issue. The regulations
encourage the use of the IRS' Form 8332244 and require that a
dependency exemption release signed by the custodial parent must be
unconditional; hence, if it is contingent on the satisfaction of a condition
such as the payment of child support, it will be ineffective. 24 Thus, the
IRS will not respect the unilateral action of a state court to allocate the
dependency deduction but if the court, under its contempt power, obtains
the signature of the custodial parent, then this allocation will be
respected by the IRS. Hence, the IRS is appropriately leaving the issue
of allocation of the dependency deduction to the states.
The following example based on a North Carolina couple illustrates
the benefits of tax arbitrage to the separated family:246
241. See, e.g., Dietz v. Dietz, 436 S.E.2d 463, 466 (Va. Ct. App. 1993); Baird v. Baird, 760
S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
242. See Vick v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 47 Cal.Rptr. 840, 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965).
243. Nichols, 547 So. 2d at 775.
244. See Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(e)(1)(ii).
245. See id. § 1.152-4(e)(1)(i). It is clear that the IRS does not want to get in the middle of
such disputes.
246. This example was based on a chart based on the 1999 tax return of a California couple.
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DIVORCED OR SEPARATED COUPLE WITH TWO CHILDREN,
NC 2009
Custodial Mother Non-custodial Father
Earnings $20,000 $40,000
Child Care Expenses $1,000
Scenario (I) Mother Claims Dependency Exemptions
Custodial Mother Non-custodial Father
Federal Income Tax $71 $4,184
Dependent Care Credit ($71)
Child Tax Credit ($2,000)
Fed. EITC ($4,269)
NC EITC ($213)
State Income Tax $488 $2,289
Total Tax Liability ($5,994) $6,473
Scenario (II) Father Claims Dependency Exemptions
Custodial Mother Non-custodial Father
Federal Income Tax $803 $2,511
Dependent Care Credit ($320)
Child Tax Credit ($2,000)
Fed. EITC ($4,269)
NC EITC ($213)
State Income Tax $788 $1,599
Total Tax Liability ($3,211) $2,110
Change in Liability $2,783 ($4,363)
Net Gain from "Trade": +$1580
The obvious question is how to allocate the gain from this trade.
The cases discussed above247 appear to be concerned with ensuring the
payment of child support, hence, any net gain from the trade will be
allocated toward the non-custodial parent's child support obligations. It
is not clear whether judges would allow use of the trade to create a
windfall for the non-custodial father. Their central concern seems to be
247. See supra notes 238-43.
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ensuring that child support payments are made and perhaps enhanced by
allocation of the dependency exemption. Most judges are sophisticated,
and they understand that the custodial parent (in the above example) is
about $3000 richer and the non-custodial parent is about $1500 poorer.
It appears that most judges would channel this tax savings "into
increased child support or other payments, thereby rendering the
custodial parent's after-tax spendable income, including child support or
other payments, the same or better than if he or she had claimed the
dependency exemption." 248  This means that in the above example a
judge would have a number of options including: (a) split the father's
income tax savings of $4363 evenly between the couple; (b) ensure that
both parties share evenly in the tax savings by allocating $3573 to the
custodial mother. She would, thus, recoup her loss of $2783 and receive
one half of the tax arbitrage savings of $1580; or (c) allocate the full
savings of $4363 to the custodial mother.
The optimum solution would be (b) as both parties would each
receive a net benefit of $790.249 Option (a) appears equitable but upon
closer inspection, it leaves the custodial mother in a worse position and
provides a large windfall to the non-custodial father. Option (c) does not
favor the father as it provides the full benefit of the tax savings to the
mother. This option or a modified version of the option could be used
by the court in case of child support deficits.
Another solution could be an increase in outreach by the IRS. Such
programs have worked in the past,250 and should be part of the solution
but not the totality of the solution because there is a limit to the
effectiveness of outreach programs.251 Yet another solution would be to
treat the separated couple as a married couple for purposes of the
248. See Nichols, 547 So. 2d at 775.
249. States such as Colorado provide software that are able to take the child dependency
allocation into child support calculations. Colorado's software is available at
http://www.divorceplanner.com/webhelp/DivorcePlanner 2010/StateSpecific/Colorado/COChil
d_SupportWorksheets.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
250. Due to the EITC publicity program initiated by the IRS, for the year 2005 taxpayers
received over $41 billion through the EITC credit, for 2006, the amount was $43.7 billion. See
Lower Income Workers Eligible For Earned Income Credit, USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 2008, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2008-01-16-earned-income-creditN.htm.
251. Despite the IRS', and cities' efforts pushing the EITC, millions of taxpayers are still not
taking advantage of the program. See Eileen Putnam, Millions of Eligible Americans Aren't
Applying For Earned Income Tax Credit, SFGATE.cOM (Jan. 27, 2008),
http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-01-27/business/17151009_1_tax-credit.
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dependency exemption and any tax savings allocated accordingly.252
This proposal, while controversial, would be effective but, under the
current political climate where Congress feels that the sanctity of
marriage is being undermined, it appears that this proposal would have
to overcome many challenges.
Finally, the tax code could be amended to reflect the permissible
tax arbitrage currently allowed. The purpose of the amendment would
be to extend current benefits provided by Congress to taxpayers who
lack the tax sophistication to take advantage of these benefits. It should
be noted that the following amendment is corrective in measure and does
not create a new benefit:
Section 24-Child Tax Credit
(g) Coordination with child support payments-
(1) In the case of an individual who is an obligor of child support
payments, any unused credit by a related person (defined as an
individual who but for claiming the credit would have entitled the first
individual to claim the child tax credit) under this section shall be
allowed as a credit against the tax of the obligor. In the case of deficit in
child support payments by the obligor, such credit shall be diverted
toward the obligor's child support deficit.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, unused credit is any credit
amount subject to the limitation under section 24(b)(3).
(3) Rules similar to subsection (1) shall apply with respect to the
unused dependency exemption under section 151.
Is the proposal good law? Our voluntary income tax system relies
on the acquiescence of taxpayers for its existence. To ensure continued
compliance, Congress has to ensure that the laws it enacts are good laws
and, thus, will be respected by taxpayers. A good law must be equitable,
efficient and simple.253 To be equitable a tax must affect similarly
situated taxpayers in the same manner (horizontal equity), and must
252. This option would be similar as an option advocated by a commentator to allocate the
dependency exemption equally between the custodial and the non-custodial parent. See Goulah,
supra note 17, at 502-03.
253. See Manoj Viswanathan, Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code: A Critical Evaluation and
Presumptions for the Future, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 656, 668 (2007); see also Krisanne M. Schlachter,
Repeal of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Will it Happen and How will it Affect Our Progressive
Tax System? 19 VA. TAX REv. 781, 792 (2000) (describing a good law as meeting four
requirements: fairness, neutrality, efficiency, and simplicity).
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disparately impact taxpayers that are not similarly situated (vertical
equity). The current system of child support taxation is not equitable
because similarly situated taxpayers may have different tax liabilities
depending on their tax sophistication and their willingness to negotiate
the claiming of the dependency exemption with their separated partner.
The current proposal would be more equitable than the current system
because it would tax such taxpayers in the same manner because the IRS
would decide the optimum use of the tax dependency exemption.
A good tax is also an efficient tax and minimally interferes with
economic behavior. Thus, "under a completely efficient system of
taxation, a taxpayer's behavior would be identical to that of a perfectly
functioning market."254 The concept of efficiency is closely related to
neutrality. A neutral tax would not affect taxpayer behavior. Some have
argued that requiring that a tax be efficient is nonsensical because
society needs government to function, which requires funding,255
meaning that any form of taxation imposed by the government would
impact taxpayer behavior. The current proposal is not designed to affect
taxpayer behavior. In fact, it assumes a particular taxpayer behavior
(lack of tax arbitrage) as its starting point.
Finally, a good tax is simple. If a tax rule is complex, it naturally
raises the costs of compliance. Complexity is generally determined
under the following three criteria: rule, compliance and transactional
complexity.256 Rule complexity refers to the problems of understanding
and interpreting the law; compliance complexity means the difficulty in
complying with the law (forms, records, etc.), and transactional
complexity relates to the expense taxpayers undergo structuring their
transaction to minimize the impact of the law.257 Under the current
proposal, rule, compliance and transactional complexity will
significantly decrease because the IRS will be charged with determining
the allocation of the dependency exemption
VI. CONCLUSION
The child support problem is more than just an economic challenge.
As argued in this article, financial support from the non-custodial parent
translates into economic, psychological and social gains for the child.258
254. Viswanathan, supra note 253, at 668.
255. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 27 (5th
ed., 2005).
256. Id. at 669.
257. Id.
258. See supra notes 27, 31-32.
144 [26:107
38
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 26 [2011], Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol26/iss1/4
SHIFTING THE PARADIGM
Very few would disagree that helping the family stay strong translates
into a stronger society. The quandary is how to provide greater support
for the family. Under the current political and budgetary climate,
government spending for new social programs does not appear to be the
solution. A workable solution is to expand the use of current tools
available. The permissible tax arbitrage with regard to the dependency
exemption is a good candidate. It is being successfully used by some
families to the tune of $1 billion per year. As we saw above, it is not
being used by the needier family mainly due to lack of tax
sophistication.
We can do better. More importantly, we have to do better. In this
article, I have advocated taking a holistic approach to the problem.
Focusing solely on the child to the exclusion of his parents may not be in
the best interests of the child. This is simply because a strong child
needs strong parents and if parents are weak, they will not be able to
produce strong children. Many judges intuitively understand that
looking at the separated family as one unit, albeit not under the same
roof, produces better results. Hence, they will allocate tax benefits
toward the goal of improving the family's overall financial condition.
Hence, a dependency exemption that may technically belong to the
custodial parent, but will be better used by the non-custodial parent is
allocated to the latter. Tax savings of the non-custodial parent are then
reallocated to the custodial mother. The result? The non-custodial
parent stays current or improves on his child support obligations. The
child wins and society ultimately wins also. If the best use of the
dependency exemption is not allowed, then the government wins and the
child loses.259
In this article, I have not advocated for the adoption of new social
programs, just the enhancement of already permissible tax arbitrage. I
have highlighted the use of this tax arbitrage by judges to the benefit of
children. This use appears to be widespread and illustrates the proper
use of tax policy.
This article provides a three-prong approach to solving the
problem. First, we must encourage judges to continue and expand their
allocation of the dependency exemption when it helps families. Second,
we must educate separated parents about the benefits of allocating the
dependency exemption in a manner beneficial to the family. Finally,
this article provides proposed language to I.R.C. § 24 that would result
in a simpler administration of the area and in savings for taxpayers as the
259. See Vick v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 47 Cal.Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965).
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IRS, instead of tax preparers, will determine the optimum use and
allocation of the dependency exemption.
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